In recent years a great deal of attention has been paid to patent reform. It is well documented that there is a capacity problem at patent offices across the world, and that delay is a problem. We develop a theoretical and empirical framework to measure the cost of delay. We examine the congestion externality that exists in patent applications, and look at the impact of raising application fees. Patent applicants pay two costs: the direct costs of application, which are relatively small, and the indirect costs of waiting in the queue, which are potentially much higher. Higher application fees lower congestion and the costs of delay. We apply our model to the USPTO, and calculate the application fees that maximize the private value of the system and the revenue to the government. Preliminary results show that the patent office revenue maximizing fee exceeds the optimal fee for patent holders, but that the optimal fee for patent holders is positive. We find that an average of $22,581 in external value is destroyed per additional patent submitted to the system. Thus, the congestion externality is non-trivial.
I. Introduction
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid to patent reform. This debate has been carried out in recent popular publications (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008) , as well as in highly publicized patent litigation such as the NTP v.
Research-in-Motion patent litigation (the Blackberry patents). The US patent system is a particular target, with claims that it is "broken" (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) and that it may harm rather than promote innovation (Bessen and Meurer, 2008) . Scholars point to the patent anti-commons (Heller, 1997) , patent thickets (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) , patent trolls (Barker, 2005) , submarine patents, patent evergreening (Kesselheim and Avorn, 2006) , and various litigation and licensing strategies as evidence of the way in which patents can be used as weapons in rent-seeking activities.
Calls for reform range from undoing some of the changes to US patent law in the 1980s and 1990s (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) to more modest reforms intended to return patent law to its roots in property rights (Bessen and Meurer, 2008) . Many scholars point to policies of pre-grant opposition or post-grant review to moderate ill-defined patent rights (Graham, et al, 2002; Hall and Harhoff, 2004) . However, these policies are expensive and put an even greater burden on already overtaxed patent examiners.
It is well documented that there is a capacity problem at patent offices across the world, and that delay is a problem (Wilson, 2008) . There have been a few studies estimating reduced form models of delay at the patent office (Harhoff and Wagner, 2006 at the EPO; Popp, et al., 2004 at the USPTO) . No studies to date have measured (theoretically or empirically) the cost of delay, the impact on patent "quality", or the competitive concerns that arise due to ill-defined patent rights. 1 Several theoretical studies (e.g., Gans, et al., 2004) conclude that low application fees and higher renewal fees are preferable, mostly because it is difficult for applicants to know in advance the commercialized value of innovations. However, these theoretical studies do not incorporate the cost of delay on current applicants caused by low application fees, and do not consider benefits from raising the overall fee structure to reduce congestion. This paper examines the congestion externality that exists in patent applications with theoretical and empirical models. The simple intuition derives from bridge toll.
When there are too many cars on the bridge, we can live with the congestion, we can widen the bridge, or we can increase the toll. In the patent context, the choice is between adding patent examination capacity at the patent office, or increasing the cost of the application. Patent applicants pay (at least) two costs: the direct costs of application, which are relatively small, and the indirect costs of waiting in the queue, which are potentially much higher. The indirect costs of delay include the reduction in present value of the returns to patent protection, as well as any competitive disadvantage conferred to the firm by delay. Higher application fees would lower congestion and the costs of delay.
While it is widely acknowledged that the costs of delay are high, there are no empirical estimates in the literature. Consequently, it is unclear whether direct or indirect costs are greater, whether the two costs are balanced on the margin, or whether total costs could be lowered by altering the application fee.
1 Wilson (2008) discusses these issues in the context of measuring the "demand for patents." His analysis does not explicitly measure the cost of delay. He recommends raising patent application fees to reduce the delay and related patent quality problems.
Our estimates-assuming that 20% of applications result in issued patents-show that the application fee that maximizes private value is approximately $2500, and that each extra application generates a congestion externality of approximately $22,500. The assumption of a 20% approval rate is conservative because as the approval rate increases, the congestion externality worsens. For instance, with a 50% approval rate, the private value maximizing application fee is approximately $6000. Additionally, current estimates do not include potential impacts of lowered delay on the quality of patent applications and issued patents.
In the following section, we sketch the process of patent disposal at the USPTO.
In section III, we present our theory model, which we illustrate with a numerical example in section IV. Section V contains our econometric work and the exploration of counterfactual scenarios with varying application fees. A final section concludes, and the appendix contains more detail on some of the calculations.
II. The Process of Patent Disposal
A stylized flow chart of the patent disposal process is in Figure 2 .1. We use the term disposal in the sense used by the USPTO: an issued or abandoned patent.
2 Upon submitting an application and paying the initial application fee, an application enters the queue for an examiners attention. Patent application fees are more complex than a simple one-time fee, even though we treat them as such in both the theoretical and empirical models. Current fees include a basic filing fee for utility patents ($330), a prior-art search fee ($540), and an examination fee ($220). Additional fees accrue for excessive claims, excessive pages, late fees, and fees for requests for continued examination (RCEs) or appeals (see Figure 2 .1). When the system is highly congested, as it currently is, much of the total pendency for an application is awaiting the first action by an examiner. In 2008, the average pendency to first action for a utility, plant, or reissue patent was 25.6 months. If patents are approved on first action, then the applicant pays the issuance fee (or chooses to abandon the application) and the patent is issued and published. If, as is more often the case than not, the application is not approved upon first action, then it is shunted into a complicated process of revision, further examination, further amendments, etc.
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As complicated as Figure 2 .1 is, it does not exhaust every avenue of the disposal process. For most of this paper, we simplify the process even further in our conceptual modeling by looking only at the choice to submit an application initially, and by not breaking apart total time to disposal down into its many elements.
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III. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we formalize the basic notions introduced above with a simple congestion model of the patent granting process. The model presented here is spare, including only the minimum set of features needed to explicate the role congestion plays in the patenting process and to motivate our empirical work. In the model, a pool of firms with patentable ideas decide at time zero whether to submit a patent application to the PTO. The firms' decisions depend on their private information about the value of their patent and their expectations about patent delay.
3 Our favorite part of the process is that the applicant can amend, request a continued application, or appeal a so-called "final rejection". 4 See Sharon & Liu (2007) for a more detailed approach to modeling the disposal process.
Patents
Begin with the economic value of a patent to originators of patentable ideas (who we will call firms). Let the present value of the returns to a patent be v, which has distribution F(v) each period, a function known to all firms. The flow of benefits underlying v does not begin until the patent is granted. Assume the firm knows v, so that F represents the aggregate distribution, not firm-level uncertainty. Let each of N f firms get one patentable idea per period. Although in the empirical work we allow N f to depend on the current state of the patenting system (such as the number of patent applications backed up at the PTO), for now we treat it as exogenous.
Patent examination delay
Let the examination and approval time at the patenting authority, including all time from application to granting, be random variable t, with conditional distribution G(t|N e ,N p ).
Variable N e is the number of patent examiners, and N p is the number of patents submitted in the period. We assume, in a manner to be made precise below, that t increases with N p and decreases with N e . G may arise, for example, as a reduced form description of the outcome of a structural queuing model of how the PTO actually works, as in Sharon and Liu (2007) . G is assumed to incorporate all approval delay from any source, including queuing time before first action by an examiner, time spent waiting for responses to queries from the examiner to the applicant, time spent after a response to the first action waiting until the examiner again takes up the case, etc. In terms of Figure 2 .1, G includes all time from the upper left box (application) to issuance in the bottom left corner (we set aside the possibility of rejection in the theory model, although not in the empirical work).
The model can easily be extended to account for an existing stock of patents already being processed by the PTO, but for simplicity we do not include any earlier submissions in N p . Likewise, we leave out any explicit role for patent application quality, which may be a choice variable of the firm that could affect delay time. 5 Finally, in the theory section (but not the empirical section) we rule out the possibility of application rejection.
With a fixed probability of rejection and the same hazard rate for rejections as for allowances, the interpretation of v merely changes to that of an expected benefit, and the model need not be adjusted. In the empirical section, we allow the hazard rate of applications that are eventually abandoned to differ from those that are granted.
The firm's problem
Let f be the patent application fee, which must be paid at time zero, in addition to other costs to the firm c of submitting an application that are not paid to the PTO. Other costs c include lawyers' fees and the opportunity cost of the firm's time spent preparing the application. Thus the total cost of applying for the patent is a = f + c.
If t were known, a firm would apply for a patent if the time zero present value of the benefits e −rt v, were at least as large as the application cost a. Let τ be the firm's (rational) expectation of the discount factor conditional on the number of examiners and the total number of applications:
Since G depends on (N e ,N p ), so does τ. Then the firm applies for a patent if τv−a ≥ 0, or
Patent applications
The proportion of firms with an idea they want to patent is 1−F(a/τ), and so there are N f [1−F(a/τ)] patents applied for. This implicitly defines N p in a rational-expectations equilibrium:
Congestion externality
Submitting another patent increases the congestion at the PTO and creates externalities for other firms. The congestion externality can be demonstrated by adding a second, exogenous source of applications to the model. Let N p from before represent the endogenous applications, and let α be the number of applications from an exogenous source. Quantity α represents garage tinkerers or unsophisticated applicants (who we exclude from the term "firms") who do not base their decision to apply on the processing capability of the PTO. Firms know α. We split applications into these groups to create an exogenous parameter upon which we can perform comparative statics. Now redefine G to be conditional on N p + α in its second argument, so that τ now has arguments τ(N e ,N p + α). To find the pecuniary externality imposed on a firm from a unit increase in α, examine how the present value τv−a to the firm changes, using the derivative as an approximation:
where τ 2 is the partial derivative of τ with respect to its second argument. Assume that τ 2 < 0, to formalize the notion that t increases with N p . If the term in parentheses on the right side of equation (2) is positive, as we show below, then when another patent is submitted to the PTO, each firm sees its expected profit from patenting fall due to increased congestion. To find dN p * /dα, the impact on endogenous applications entirely due to the congestion externality from one more (exogenous) application, rewrite (1) as:
Totally differentiate (1) (holding N e constant):
where f is the density function of patent values (the derivative of F). Rearranging (2) leads to
where the inequality follows from assuming that τ 2 < 0. The patent displacement due to congestion is only partial; from inspecting (4) one can see that |dN p * /dα | < 1.
Result 1 (partial displacement)
When an application is submitted to the patenting authority, it discourages fewer than one application from other decision makers.
With Result 1 and inequality (4), we see that the pecuniary externality on firms from congestion, equation (2) is indeed negative. Inequality (4) is the congestion effect on patents:
Result 2 (the congestion externality on applications)
When an extra application is submitted to the patenting authority, it causes the other decision makers to submit fewer patents.
Firms submit fewer patents when another exogenous application arrives because the time to approval for every application increases. The congestion effect thus lowers the present value of patent protection, making some marginal patents unprofitable to submit to the PTO. Result 2 concerns only the congestion externality on the number of applications, and thus affects patents at the margin. Another externality from congestion affects the inframarginal patents (those still submitted), which lose present value due to the longer approval time. We discuss this below. It is worth noting that Results 1 and 2 hold regardless of the functional form of the distribution of patent values, the size of the application fee, or the number of firms.
Value of the externality
The patents lost in equation (4) from the congestion effect are those that were profitable when t was expected to be lower but are no longer profitable when t is expected to be higher. Let v * (N e ,N p ) be the value of the marginal (breakeven) patent when there are N e examiners and N p applications: v * = a/τ(N e ,N p ). The total (private) value of all patents (excluding the one from α 6 ) in equilibrium is
where the expectation of the truncated random variable is found as
6 Excluding the patents from the exogenous source is formally justified by evaluating all expressions at α = 0.
which is negative, assuming again that τ 2 < 0 and using the result from (4) above.
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Using these results, the change in total value V 1 (i.e., private value lost to congestion externality) is
which is negative, using inequalities (4) and (5) and noting that since the value of the average patent must be positive, it must be that
The first term in the curly brackets comes from the marginal effect of congestion (the value of the lost applications). The second term in the curly brackets comes from the inframarginal effect of congestion (the reduction in average value of the remaining applications).
Against the value of the harm to the other firms, the value of the "extra" patent, assuming it has characteristics similar to the average endogenous application, is
From Result 2 above, we see that the value of the extra patent outweighs the harm to others' value due to the marginal effect of congestion. However, when the inframarginal effect of congestion is subtracted from value, the sign of the net change in value is unclear. Depending on the density of values and the number of other patents, total value may decrease. In summary, congestion in the patent granting process imposes real costs on the economy, and may even be so bad as to cause a net loss in the private value of patents every time another patent application is filed.
7 To see that the expression in square brackets is positive, note that
IV. Numerical Example
Figures 4.1-4.3 show the results of a numerical solution to the theoretical model. We normalize the number of firms (and thus, patents) to N f = 1, and let the number of examiners be N e = 0.05. We assume that the value of patentable inventions is distributed according to an exponential distribution with mean one, so that we can think of an individual invention's value as a multiple of the average.
In this simplification, all applications are eventually approved. This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that a proportion of applications are rejected (either randomly or according to some patent quality). The approval delay at the patent office is assumed to be a random variable distributed lognormally with scale parameter σ equal to one, and with median equal to N p /N e . This arbitrary, ad hoc specification allows delay to increase with the workload of the patent office.
The cost of delay is due to the fact that an individual firm will need to wait longer before it gains the revenue from the invention. For the numerical solutions, we assume a 20% discount rate (r = 0.2). The application fee is varied for the numerical solutions, and the equilibrium number of applications, N p * , is calculated numerically according to equation (1). Figure 3 shows the expected average private value to patent holders as a function of the application fee. As a group, applicants prefer an application fee greater than zero.
At a = 0, the patent office makes no revenue, all inventions will result in applications, and the high expected delay will mean that patent holder wealth is diminished. With higher application fees, there is a steep drop-off in applications (the abundant, low value inventions), and thus a significant drop in expected delay. Private value peaks and then decreases when the decrease in the cost of expected delay from increased application fees does not make up for the increase in the application fee itself. In our simulation, this peak occurs around a = 0.6, at a value less than that which maximizes patent office revenue.
Together, the simulations emphasize three points. Delay at the patent office can be costly to innovators, but the application fee can be used to offset this delay cost to a point. That is, at first higher application fees are good for the firm, because they discourage applications and improve throughput for applications that are filed. Thus, unlike most markets without externalities, lower prices (application fees) are not necessarily better for demanders (firms, here). Second, the PTO has a "revenue hill" like any firm pricing with market power. Third, the optimal fee from the PTO's point of view is higher than the best fee for the firm. This follows from the fact that it is part of the firms marginal cost, while it is part of the PTO's marginal revenue.
Extensions of the model include imposing a self-funding constraint on the patent office where the number of examiners is a function of revenue, and incorporating commercialization uncertainty for firms. We plan to address these in later work.
V. Empirical Results
In this section we describe our data, report the results of our estimations to find parameters for the model, and use the resulting model to optimize the patent system with regard to various objectives.
A. Data
We use two datasets, both from the USPTO. The first is taken from the USPTO Annual Reports, and includes a variety of annual data from which we construct time series.
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Whenever possible we use data pertaining to utility patents only, although some variables are for all utility, plant, and reissue (UPR) patents. Given that less than 1% of UPR patents are plant or reissue patents, the distinction is not important. Data include the number of patent applications filed each year, the number of patents pending (pendgUPR), average pendency (avePendency, the time from application to disposal [approval or abandonment]), PTO personnel that work on UPR patents (persUPR), and the number of disposals each year.
The statistics in the annual reports pertain to a fiscal year ending September 30, not the calendar year. The reports can be found online at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/index.jsp. 9 A patent disposal is the final outcome for a patent. The patent approval process terminates in issuance or abandonment for each patent. grown even more rapidly. The growing backlog of pending patents, even in the face of a greater number of patent examiners than ever before, has led some commentators to conclude that the PTO will not be able to hire its way out of the problem (GAO, 2007) .
As the backlog has grown, average pendency has also increased. The variable avePendency is also shown in Figure 5 .1, with the scale in months on the right side of the graph. Pendency has lengthened from about 18 months in 1989 to 32 months by 2008.
Another feature of the data, which complicates matter, is that until 2009, the fraction of patents that were granted was falling precipitously (Figure 5 .2). After several years of criticism that patents were being awarded too leniently (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) , the PTO raised the bar for a patent to be approved. In the latest year of data, the recent trend changes direction again, with a sharp uptick in allowed patents. This creates some
uncertainly as to what our assumed allowance rate should be in the forward-looking calculations we undertake. For this draft, we use an allowance rate of 20%, based on our calculations for recent years, but eventually we will vary the rate for purposes of sensitivity analysis.
The other dataset contains patent-level data on all issued patents from 2001 through June 2009. The dataset has more variables on patent characteristics than we currently use in the estimations. For now, the important variables in these data are the data of application and issuance, so that the total time in the PTO system until issuance is known. It is important to note that these data include only patents that are eventually granted. We return to this point below. There are 3.3 million utility patents in the data.
B. The Application Process
In our first exploration of the data, we look at the process generating applications submitted to the USPTO. The theory above suggests that at a minimum the number of applications depends on expected time to disposal and the application fee. We also expect that the size of the economy is related to the number of applications. The latter relationship is difficult to separate from a pure time trend, since over time GDP in the US generally rises. Consider Figure 5 .3, where (in two panels) the log of applications are The dependent variable is the count of applications, and the regressors are log real GDP, pending UPR patents, and UPR personnel. All variables are lagged one year to reflect information available at the time of submission, to break simultaneity, and to aid in the construction of the counterfactuals below. The pending patents and personnel are both proxies for a firm's expectation of time until patent approval, and thus we expect the coefficient on pendgUPR to be negative and the coefficient on persUPR to be positive.
Each of the estimated coefficients is in line with expectations and is significant at the 5% level or better. 10 The coefficient on GDP shows that the elasticity of applications with respect to GDP is 3.8, highly elastic. The coefficient on pendgUPR implies a marginal effect of -0.21. Thus, each additional patent clogging the system discourages 11 one fifth of a new application next year. The coefficient on persUPR implies that an additional patent examiner spurs 7.9 new applications the following year. The fit of the regression is quite good; see Figure 5 .4.
C. The Disposal Process
Estimation with the aggregate data We first examine the disposal process using the annual time series. We first want to determine the examination time an examiner spends on each patent implied by the data.
In general, for a queuing system with multiple servers (here, UPR examiners), the nonsteady-state likelihood for the output from the system (here, patent disposals) is an expression that is quite complicated (Saaty, 1961) . 12 Here, however, we can rely on a convenient result from queuing theory given that the examiners always have a backlog of waiting patents. If there are k servers in a queuing system, each with an exponential service time distribution with rate μ, and the servers are constantly in use, then (regardless of queue length or the distribution of the arrival process) output from the system is a Poisson stochastic process with rate kμ (Saaty, 1961, p.34) . The mean output is thus also kμ per period.
The estimation for μ is given in Table 5 .2. In the first estimation, k, taken to equal persUPR, is used as the exposure variable in a Poisson regression.
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μ is equal to the exponentiated constant from the regression, or exp(4.3) = 70.9. If, on average, an examiner disposes of 71 patents per year, then at 250 workdays per year, it takes the examiner about 3.5 days per disposal. 14 The immediately apparent fact is that very little of the total pendency time for a patent is due to time spend under active examination.
The rest of the time is spent queuing in various parts of the system (waiting for docketing, waiting for first examination, etc.) and in processing by the applicant (response to questions from the examiner, time spent deciding whether to amend or resubmit an application, etc.). With a processing capacity of 71 applications per year per examiner, then the current staffing level of 6,143 implies that with more than 436,153 applications arriving yearly the backlog will continue to grow. In 2009, in fact, there were 485,500 utility applications filed. Table 5 .2 also contains a second estimation with a linear time trend, which shows that the examination rate declined over time slightly, and an estimation with year dummies instead of linear trend that shows that the slowdown was mostly monotonic.
The slowdown may be due to examiners taking more care with applications recently after years of criticism that too many "bad" patents were being granted and that patent issuance was devolving into a rubber stamp. It may also be an artifact of the data if the ratio of non-examiners to examiners among UPR personnel is growing, since our personnel measure includes all UPR staff, not just examiners. The fits from each regression, along with the underlying data, are shown in Figure 5 .5.
13 See the Stata manual for details. Adding an exposure variable to the regression means that the resulting examination rate can be interpreted as a "per examiner-year" rate. 14 Compare this with the statement of Jaffe and Lerner (2005) that it takes 2 to 2.5 days to examine a patent.
Other than demonstrating that active processing time by an examiner is very small, we do not directly use the above estimations in the counterfactual exercises. The small number of annual observations on disposals is far too small to allow detailed estimation of the hazard rate of a patent moving through the system, and in any event, we are not interested in just the active processing time but the entire pendency time.
Estimation with the microdata
Given the limitations of the above, we turn next to estimation of patent pendency using the individual patent microdata. While we intend to estimate eventually a structural model informed by queuing theory, for now we estimate a reduced form model that relates pendency to the processing capacity of the PTO and the amount of congestion.
The distribution of patent approval delays has been studied in reduced form with microdata by Popp et al. (2004) and Harhoff & Wagner (2006) . While we intend to estimate eventually a structural model of the patent granting process that is informed by queuing theory (as attempted by Sharon & Liu, 2007) , for now we also estimate a reduced form model that relates pendency to the processing capacity of the PTO and the amount of congestion.
We use a Cox proportional hazards regression model where the baseline hazard rate is nonparametrically estimated and the time-varying covariates are lagged persUPR and pendgUPR. 15 In the Cox model, the hazard rate of the patent disposal process is:
where λ 0 is an arbitrary, unspecified baseline hazard and x i is a vector of covariates for spell i. 16 Given the nature of the data, the estimated coefficients and implied survival curves are for total time (including all queuing) from the application date to the date of issuance, conditional on the patent being granted. We drop observations where the application date is after December 31, 2003 to reduce truncation bias (recall that patents in process as of July 2009 are not in the sample). The availability of covariates also limits us to years 2002 forward. The final sample has 888,132 patents, which after splitting for the time varying covariates results in 2.7 million spells. Results are in Table   5 .3.
As expected, the reduced form modeling picks up the same general notions that more precise structural modeling based on queuing theory would presumably also show:
pendency is longer when there are more patents already in the system and shorter when there are more examiners. Both coefficients are highly significant. The baseline survival curve, showing the fraction of patents expected to take longer than the time on the x-axis to be granted, is in Figure 5 .6. The survival curve is calculated at the mean value of the covariates, and so represents "average" survival. The figure reveals that while median pendency to granting is between two and three years, a full 20% of applications take longer than four years.
The disposal process for rejected patent applications
We now have a detailed characterization of pendency, and how it relates to congestion and personnel at the PTO, for granted patents. However, many patents (most, in recent years-refer back to Figure 5 .2) are rejected, and we do not wish to assume that they share the same pendency as granted patents. A priori, rejected patents may take shorter or longer to work through the system. If many applicants give up on approval at the first rejection, then the time to rejection may be shorter than to granting. On the other hand, if applicants avail themselves of the multiple opportunities to amend, resubmit, and appeal before ultimate rejection (and there are many such options-refer to figure 2.1), then the rejected patents may be in the system for much longer.
We have no data with which to estimate directly the time to rejection. Instead, we do the following. We begin with the (untestable) assumption that the hazard rate of rejects is proportional to that of granted patents. Define ρ to be the constant of proportionality. Then, in step one of our procedure, we estimate how many applications there were each year that were (or will be) eventually rejected, M rt . We do this by taking the difference between the number of utility patent applications each year (M t , observed in the annual USPTO data) and an estimate of the number of utility patent applications in each year that were (or will likely be) eventually approved, M at . We find the latter directly from the survival curve estimation.
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In step two, we calculate (given M at , M rt , and any given value of ρ) the expected number of patents rejected in year t, n rt . We do this by following each cohort of applications forward in time and computing how many are disposed in each year, given estimated survival at the year's covariates. In step three, we define a criterion function to minimize: the squared difference between n r2007 and the actual number of patents rejected in 2007. 18 The criterion is a function of ρ. In step three, we choose ρ to minimize the criterion. Given that we have one degree of freedom (ρ) and one year's expected value, we can find a value of ρ that sets the criterion to zero. The resulting estimated ρ is about 0.5, implying that the hazard rate for rejections is half that of approvals, or that eventually rejected patents take longer to work through the system.
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D. Counterfactual Exercises
With the supporting estimations now complete, we can explore the response of applicants and the disposal process to policy changes. For now, we focus solely on changing the application fee, and leave the number of UPR personnel unchanged at its 2009 level. We consider more than one counterfactual scenario, but each shares a common set of 2. Determine the number of those patents that will still be submitted with the higher fee. The details are in the appendix, but the intuition may be seen in Figure 5 .7. Assume for explication that the potential applicant knows the value of the patent (v from the theory model in section 3). At the current fee a 1 , potential applications in the distribution to the left of v 1 (with mass given by the yellow shaded area) are not submitted to the USPTO, because their value is too low. When the application fee increases to a 2 , an additional mass of patents (the green area between v 1 and v 2 ) will not be submitted. The actual distribution we use for patent value comes from Bessen (2008) , and is shown in Figure 5 .8. The calculation requires several assumptions, including the fraction of applications that will be approved (20%, based on our calculation for recent years), and how the firm assesses τ, the expected discount factor from the theory model. Regarding the latter, we assume the firm bases its expectations on survival as estimated in Table 5 .3, evaluated at the covariates pertaining to the year of application. 21 We also assume the firm's discount rate is 10%, following Bessen (2008) (who claims in turn that he is following the literature).
3. Determine the number of disposals for the year. Starting with the stock of pending patents at the beginning of the year and the year's new applications from step 2, this involves:
a. Determine the expected age profile of the stock of pending patents. For the first year (2010), this involves using the hazard rates for approvals and rejections in the past (i.e., hazards calculated using the estimation in Table 5 .3 and the actual value of the time-varying covariates during years before 2010). In later years, we follow each cohort of applications forward in time (until they are all disposed) to determine the age profile.
We must know the age profile of the pending patents because the disposal process, viewed as a duration model, is not memoryless (that is, the baseline survival curve in Figure 5 .6 is not that for an exponential random variable).
b. Given the age profile, calculate how many expected approvals and rejections there are for the year from each cohort. This is computed given the predicted hazard rates based on the estimation in Table 5 headway with the backlog of patents for the first few years, due to slowed growth in applications (due to the congestion) and increasing disposals (due to the large amount of staff, by historical standards). As we refine our queuing model, we expect that the number of disposals will not rise so much under the status quo. This is because the time to disposal in the model is based on the estimation in Table 5 .3, which returns hazard rates that are probably too high. 22 The ten-year-out NPV of the patenting system is $90.7 trillion.
Maximum Private Value
Since we base our distribution of patent value on estimates from renewal models (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984) , we briefly describe them. Renewal models estimate the distribution of patent value based on observations of the proportion of patents that pay renewal fees (maintenance fees) at patent offices. In the US, renewal fees are due at three and a half ($980), seven and a half ($2480), and eleven and a half ($4111) years after issuance. 23 Fees in the US (and in other countries) escalate over time, so that patents become more expensive to maintain as they mature. By observing the proportion of patents that are renewed to the full term, the underlying distribution of patent value can be estimated. One drawback to this method is that renewal models do a poor job of estimating the long tail of highly valuable patents, because those patents fall far outside the maximum maintenance fee (Harhoff et al, 2003) . We rely on Bessen (2008) because his estimates are very recent and are based entirely on US data.
For the first counterfactual exercise, we look for the patent application fee that maximizes the expected NPV of the private value to the firms. The initial application fee affects this value in complicated ways. The direct effect of raising the fee is to 22 The basic problem comes from feeding the model covariates that are well outside the region the covariates take in the sample. E.g., we do not have observations in the sample with 2009 staffing levels but only half the stock of pending patents as there were in 2009. This is where a structural queuing model will help. 23 See http://uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2009september15.htm, accessed 12/1/2009. discourage applications because the firm bears the higher immediate cost of submitting an application. The indirect effect of raising the fee is that with fewer applications overall, the expected time to approval falls, increasing the present value of a granted patent. However, with a higher fee, the summed future value of all granted patents is less to begin with, so the impact of changing the application fee is highly nonlinear.
To determine the expected net present value of the patents that are submitted, we do the following. For rejected applications, the value is zero. For approved patents, it is the expected value conditional on the patent value surpassing the threshold v 2 in figure   5 .7. Given the distribution we use from Bessen (2008) for patent values, this calculation involves the expectation of a lognormal random variable that is truncated from below.
Details are in the appendix. From both types of applications, the application fee is subtracted to find NPV. To convert the patent value for granted patents to present value, the time to approval is estimated from the predicted evolution of the disposal process in the future (that is, the estimated behavior of the queuing system under the new application fee). For years after 2010, the total NPV for the future year is discounted back to 2010 using a 10% discount rate.
Using the steps above, the expected NPV of the private value of the patent system was found to be maximized with an application fee of $2,528. We expect that as we refine our queuing model of the patent system that we will find that this initial estimate is low. The figure is also low because we assume that only 20% of patents are approved.
In an initial exploration (only the first step toward a complete sensitivity analysis) we found that with a 50% approval rate, the optimal application fee more than doubles. With a higher approval rate, the firms NPV calculus improves and the application fee must be pushed higher to obtain the same reduction in applications.
The middle panel of Figure 5 .9 shows the system outcomes (applications, disposals, and pending) with this higher application fee. Compared to the status quo in the top panel, there are fewer applications and faster disposal, which brings down the stock of pending applications more than in the status quo. The ten-year-out NPV of the patenting system is $92.2 trillion, or about 1.7% better than the predicted status quo would be.
Maximum PTO Value
Given that over time, the U.S. Congress has increasingly treated the USPTO as a profit center, 24 it is interesting to calculate the application fee that would maximize the PV of application fees. Holding personnel constant at the 2009 level, an application fee of $313,657 maximizes the value to the PTO from application fees. Given this, it is surprising that Congress has not pushed application fees higher to date, at least for large corporate applicants. 25 The bottom panel of Figure 5 .9 shows the system outcomes (applications, disposals, and pending) with this very high application fee. Since the fee chokes off nearly all applications right away, the stock of pending patents disappears after two years, and after that the system has enough capacity to handle applications as they arrive, so that pending applications do not build up in the system. This gives strong indication that if net revenue maximization were the PTO's goal, it would also cut back on the number of personnel. We do not explore this further with the present model. 24 See ch. 5 of Jaffe and Lerner (2004) . 25 We plan to explore eventually the tradeoff between the number of examiners and the application fee. However, until we have a better (structural) model of the queuing system in place we cannot do this.
Value of the externality
We also use our model to calculate the value of the congestion externality. To do this,
we exogenously add in an extra 1% of applications to the system in 2010, and see how the private NPV of the original set of (endogenously determined) applications changes.
We set the application fee at the level that maximizes private value in these computations.
At the end of the theory section, we discussed that the value of the extra patents 
VI. Conclusions
Our exploration of raising the application fees, while preliminary, highlights the potential to use congestion pricing to increase the value of the patenting system for firms and the government. There are many issues we have yet to address in this work. Chief among these is the development of a structural empirical queuing model, which will likely need to be estimated by via simulation. Doing so should give us more realistic performance of the queue in the counterfactual explorations. Disposal delay comes from two sources: the queuing time an application spends in the examiner's "inbox", and the active processing and review time. An appropriately designed queuing model can distinguish these two sources of delay, which then can better shed insight into the transient dynamics of throughput when the number of examiners changes or the number of applications decreases. Empirical queuing theory has been fruitfully applied to other instances of regulatory delay (Prieger 2002a,b) . Nevertheless, we believe our current reduced form approach shows promise, as a "proof of concept" if nothing else.
We can also extend the theoretical model to examine the relationship between examination time and patent quality. By ignoring patent quality, we are likely finding "optimal" congestion fees that are too low. If examiners could spend more time per patent to improve the quality of issued patents, there would be additional benefits to raising the application fee. Exploring this avenue awaits future work.
Appendix
A. Determining the counterfactual number of patent applications
Here we give more detail on how we compute the expected number of applications in a given year when we change the application fee. We start with Bessen's (2008) work on the distribution of private patent values. He postulates a model where the incremental profit flow from a patent is
where d is the depreciation and π i (0) is distributed lognormal with scale parameter σ.
The present value of the profit flow for a patent granted in force from zero to T is: -exp(-(d+r) )T]/(d+r) = 3.93 (at the average observed T in the sample).
Setting aside the issue of whether the patent is renewed, then equation (A-1) implies that v is proportional to a lognormal random variable, and so is lognormal itself with the same scale parameter σ. Denote the mean of log v to be μ. Bessen (2008) calculates the mean of v to be $78,168 in 1992 $US and estimates σ to be 1.86. We update the mean to 2009 $US using the CPI and use m = $119,169 for the mean of v.
Knowing these figures allows us to calculate the implied location parameter μ: if We choose Bessen's estimate because among the few available for US patents (most such work has been done on European patents) his work is well documented and relatively simple (i.e., he does not condition on a lot of factors we do not want to worry about for now). There are some things to note about the estimated distribution. It is the private net present value to the firm of a granted patent, net of future patent renewal fees.
The value does not include the cost of the original application. Now, if we took Figure 5 .7 literally, and assumed that firms knew the value that patenting would add to their profit, then the distribution for v ex post granting would already be truncated below (at v 1 in the figure). Due to errors in expectations, learning, and the fact that Bessen chose a distributional form that has support starting at zero, our lognormal distribution for granted patents is not in fact truncated below at v 1 . In our calculations, however, we approximate and treat v 1 as if it were zero. That is, when we want to know the theoretical (green shaded) area between v 1 and v 2 , we integrate the lognormal distribution from zero up to v 2 . The important thing is that we need to know is what mass of patents is below v 2 from a distribution where the lowest value patents (in a priori expectation) have already been excluded, and this seems to be a sensible first approach using the information at hand.
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To calculate the number of those patents that will still be submitted with a higher application fee for step two of our procedure outlined in the text, we need to know the mass to the right v 2 of in Figure 5 .7. First, note that from the theory section, we have
. This is the figure we multiply the applications (predicted assuming the status quo application costs) by to arrive at our predicted applications under the higher fee.
B. Determining the value of a submitted patent application
To determine the value of an application to a firm, we need to know the expected value of v given that v > v 2 . This is the expectation of a truncated lognormal random variable, which Johnson et al. (1994) state to be:
Given the important role that this expectation plays in our analysis, it is appropriate to be concerned that the tail of the distributions of patent values is not estimated well. After all, the tail behavior is largely governed by the assumption that the distribution is lognormal.
We plan to explore this further, but for now note that Bessen (2008, p.934) claims that Table notes : GDPrln is the log of real GDP, pendgUPR is the stock of pending utility, plant, and reissue patents at the end of the fiscal year, and persUPR is the number of personnel in the utility, plant, and reissue patent division at the USPTO in the fiscal year. 
